Given the size of the local government sector, it can readily be appreciated why policy-makers directed their initial efforts at the larger State and federal govern ments.
Second, systematic change would be harder to achieve in local government in Australia, comprising as it does some 775 councils of varying size and importance, than in its much more cohesive and compact State and Commonwealth counter parts.
Nevertheless, considerable gains could flow from the comprehensive reform of local government in Australia. After all, in 1995 it spent in excess of $10.5 billion and employed around 156,000 people (Johnstone, 1995:13) . This has been recog nised by both die federal government and several State and territory governments. For instance, the then Commonwealth Minister for Local Government, Warwick Smith (1996:1) , noted in his address to the National General Assembly of the Aus tralian Local Government Association on 3 December 1996 that All governments must anticipate and react to continual change and respond to rising pressures from the community, business and government sectors to improve efficiency and effectiveness of their services. Local government is no exception.
The Minister went on to identify the nature of the reforms envisaged by the Com monwealth government. These included regulatory reform, benchmarking and performance indicators, competitive tendering and contracting, competition policy, and restructuring.
Restructuring, or amalgamation, is the most controversial item on the agenda of Australian local government reform. Yet the presumption that enforced amalga mations of small municipal councils will necessarily give rise to substantial econo mies of scale remains unproven. Studies in Australia to date have admittedly been inadequate in depth and breadth; but the American evidence indicates that larger units tend to be associated with proportionately higher spending than smaller units. Moreover, if the argument over amalgamation is extended from economics to in clude issues such as communities of interest, voter representation, local democracy, participation and vibrancy, then it is further weakened. Accordingly, while more research in greater depth is urgently required, it would be prudent at this stage to adopt die voluntary approach to amalgamations pioneered by New South Wales, and to explore enhanced 'resource sharing' such as already successfully occurs with regional libraries, waste disposal, joint purchasing arrangements, and so forth.
The Extent of Local Government Reform in Australia
Structural change in local government involves amalgamations of existing councils, boundary changes, voluntary cooperation and joint action between local authorities.
Local government in Australia is essentially a creature of State legislation and die views of State governments on amalgamation are decisive. Two generic ap proaches to amalgamation, which has recendy occurred in most States, are evident: the voluntary approach, as adopted in New South Wales, and the compulsory ap proach, as adopted in Victoria. Current Commonwealth policy seems to favour the Victorian approach. In practice, most States have adopted an approach that falls somewhere between these two extremes. Enthusiasm for amalgamation appears greatest in Victoria, resistance to it most pronounced in New South Wales and Western Australia (Gerritsen & Osborn, 1997; Kiss, 1997; Wensing, 1997) .
Under the auspices of the Local Government Board inaugurated in May 1993, die number of local governments in Victoria has been reduced from 210 to 78. Similarly, under the Local Government Boundary Board in South Australia, 63 new councils have been incorporated, with the total number of councils falling from 118 to 81. Queensland's Office for Local Government has overseen the amalga mation of 16 local government areas into seven councils, along with boundary changes to a further 16 councils. Under the Local Government Act 1996, Western Australia's 142 local authorities have made submissions on rationalisation proce dures which are presently being considered. During 1992-94, the number of local governments in Tasmania fell from 46 to 29 in a program carried out by the Tas manian Local Government Board. By contrast, New South Wales has yet to initi ate major restructuring. However, between 1946 and 1982 die number of municipalides in New Soudi Wales was reduced from 289 to 175,1 which may ease die pressure for local government restructuring in diat State.
Assessing the Impact of Amalgamations
It is too early to determine die full impact of diese amalgamadons. Moreover, few empirical studies have been undertaken; and the litde work diat has been done has focused exclusively on the economic impact of amalgamadon. Roger Hallam, for merly Victoria's Local Government Minister, has authored two reviews of his gov ernment's local government reform program (Hallam, 1994 (Hallam, , 1995a , bodi of which examine efficiency radier dian polidcal issues like access, pardcipaUon and representadon. He has argued diat in economic terms Victorian restructuring has been very successful:
A worst-case scenario could have been small, inefficient and expensive councils... "Ehe individual targets set for councils were based on die find ings of die Local Government Board and were determined after consultadon widi die councils. Councils were given a three-year period in which to achieve the targets, which represented aggregate savings of between $362m and $395m across the 78 councils. To my delight, and relief, in September I was able to announce diat based on die council budgets, they would achieve, in diis first year, an aggregate savings of about 90 per cent of the uldmate target. (Hallam, 1995b:68) Chapman (1995) found that Tasmanian amalgamations lowered administration costs considerably. However, he noted that his study did not deal with effectiveness and urged caution in interpreting his findings.
Warwick Smith (1996:5) shared the assumption that significant economies of scale and scope exist in local government that can be captured by amalgamating small councils into larger consolidated local authorities:
Where it has occurred, structural reform of local government has provided significant economic benefits to the community. Studies suggest that some of die measurable benefits of structural reform include: • lower administration costs; • lower costs of representation; • increased purchasing power and better use of plant and equipment; and • a more diverse funding base.
Moreover, the Commonwealth government views amalgamation as the most ef fective way of enhancing the efficiency of Australian local government (Smith, 1996: 6):
[Dlespite the best results which benchmarking and competitive tendering can produce, perhaps the biggest boost to improved efficiency in Local Government can come from a reduction in the number of Councils. There is no doubt in my mind that efficiencies will result from fewer but larger councils.
Endiusiastic support for amalgamation on economic grounds exists also in aca demic and business circles. For example, the Property Council of Australia has 'claimed diat local councils in NSW (particularly in the Sydney Metropolitan Re gion) were too fragmented, inefficient and parochial, which provided a framework for substantial diseconomies in service delivery and public administration' (Local Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales, 1997:13). Similarly, Soul (1997:6) has argued that 'from any objective assessment, small municipalities hold little economic political or social advantage, and the institution of local gov ernment, in its present form, does little to advance the public interest or indeed, its own long-term interests'.
Arguments against amalgamation typically focus on the purported threat it poses for local government democracy. Reduced employment is sometimes also cited, especially in small rural communities where councils are often the largest employer (Vince, 1997) . As Warwick Smith (1996:6) has put it, ...structural reform may have some perceived negatives and some of the concerns expressed include:
• diminished communities of interest; • diminished voter representation; • dominance of one area over another, and associated with this, the loss of identity; • some loss of local government; and • initial, mosdy one-off, financial costs of implementing the reform process.
Here, however, my concern is solely with die claim that the amalgamation of existing small councils into larger local government audiorities enhances economic efficiency and effectiveness. The argument has two dimensions: theoretical consid erations deriving from die dieory of fiscal federalism; and empirical evidence from die international literature.
Theoretical Considerations
'Fiscal federalism' refers to die division of taxing and expenditure powers among die different levels of government comprising a federation. The economic dieory of fiscal federalism, derived largely from Oates (1972) , provides insights into die consequences of different arrangements for distributing responsibility for supplying public goods and services among various levels and sizes of government and for differential financing arrangements. The dieory gives rise to die 'correspondence principle', which stipulates diat die size of a particular government should corre spond to die area of benefit flowing from die goods it provides to cidzens. Moreo ver, each public good should be provided by the smallest (that is, lowest-level) gov ernment consistent widi the absence of spatial spillovers into odier regions.
The concept of a 'benefit region' is crucial to die applicafion of die correspon dence principle. Almost all public goods have geographically limited areas in which diey confer benefits on citizens. For instance, while some public goods, like na tional defence, have a nationwide benefit region, odiers, such as streedighdng, have severely localised benefit regions. In democradc societies, citizens of specific bene fit regions vote for die services diey want and should be obliged to pay for diese services. Thus, services which are nationwide in dieir benefit incidence (like de fence forces) should be provided nationally; services widi regional benefits (such as highway systems) should be provided regionally; and services widi local benefits (like streedights and pavements) should be provided locally. The notion of the benefit region provides die basis for die concept of an optimal community size which underlies arguments for amalgamation.
The dieory of fiscal federalism holds diat die optimal size of governments pro viding a given range of services is determined by the size of die benefit region in accordance widi die correspondence principle. But local public goods may have benefit regions of different sizes, some of which will extend into the jurisdictions of adjacent local governments. Such spillovers have at least two important policy im plications. First, diey create a priina facie case for the joint provision of the local public good in question by adjacent local governments. Second, they create a priina facie case for 'matching grants' from higher levels of government in proportion to the extent of the spillovers.
However, such spillovers do not necessarily provide a case for the amalgama tion of adjacent councils. The primary reason for this is quintessentially economic and independent of non-economic concerns about die loss of local democracy that allegedly flows from local government amalgamations. Local public services vary gready in dieir economic characteristics, like economies of scale and benefit re gions. This has important implications for determining optimal public service pro vision in local government. For example, it is highly unlikely diat die optimal serv ice district for fire protection services will coincide, or even resemble, optimal serv ice districts for, say, refuse collection, public parks, or sewage treatment services. It follows on theoretical grounds diat a single common service district for even a rela tively small number of local public services resulting from die amalgamation of small councils may not be efficient, even if any positive gains in administrative effi ciency are included. This argument has some interesting policy implications for contemporary local government in Australia.
Empirical Considerations
As already observed, litde empirical work has been undertaken on die economic effects of amalgamation in Australian local government. Moreover, despite exten sive structural reform in Canada, New Zealand and die United Kingdom, surpris ingly litde empirical evidence has been gadiered in diese countries on die question of whedier small or large local government units are more efficient in local public good delivery. For instance, Boyne (1992:355) has argued dial in die United King dom an 'empirical vacuum' surrounds local government restructuring since 'hardly anything is known about die consequences of structural change'. Fortunately, con siderable research effort has been devoted to die economic consequences of amal gamation in die United States, which can provide some empirical guidance on the issue of amalgamation.
Two kinds of economies can result from the amalgamation of small councils into larger local government audiorities. First, economies of scale can arise, as av erage production costs fall widi increasing output. In the context of local govern ment amalgamation, economies of scale would need to generate a per capita reduc tion in average production costs to be meaningful. Second, economies of sccpe (die financial advantages which accrue by providing a range of goods and services dirough a single organisation radier dian dirough several organisations) often stem from die shared attribution of administrative and odier 'overheads' amongst many services.
"fable 2 summarises some of die evidence on diese economies in die Uniied States. 'Fragmentation' refers to die number of separate units in a local government system. 'Horizontal fragmentation' refers to the number of governmental units in a given tier of government, like local government By contrast, 'vertical fragmertation' refers to the number of governmental units in a governmental hierarchy. 'General fragmentation' refers to bodi horizontal and vertical fragmentation. A process of local government amalgamation would thus reduce horizontal fragmen tation, but not necessarily vertical fragmentation. It follows that amalgamation would also decrease the degree of general fragmentation. Table 2 summarises die findings of 25 studies on die economic effects of differendal degrees of fragmentadon on die costs of service delivery in American local government: This evidence tells against bodi official policy and convendonal wisdom about die efficiency of large local governments in Australia. For instance, highly horizon tally fragmented local governments spent less in 13 cases compared widi higher spending in only seven cases. Similarly, highly generally fragmented local authorides spent more in eight cases and less in nine cases, widi twelve spending about the same as less fragmented systems. Boyne (1992:252) himself drew die following conclusions after reviewing diis evidence:
In sum, die broad pattern of die evidence suggests that lower spending is a feature of fragmented and deconcentrated local government systems. By contrast, consolidated and concentrated structures tend to be associated widi higher spending. This implies diat die technical benefits of large units widi big market shares, such as economies of scale and scope, are out weighed by compeddve and polidcal costs, such as disincendves towards fis cal migration and problems of public scrutiny.
In a comparable but broader survey of the international empirical evidence on scale economies, which included state, regional and local governments, Bald and Vogt (1975:13-14) concluded as follows:
[M]ost positive findings of scale economies are based on statistical results diat show a negative relationship between population size and per capita expenditures. There are great statistical and theoretical problems widi in terpreting such results as showing scale economies, and about as many studies that find a negative relationship find a positive one.
Policy Implications
Economic arguments provide support for the voluntary approach to amalgamations adopted by New South Wales. There are no sound a priori reasons for assuming that similar benefit regions exist for the range of services typically provided by councils. So although economies of scope probably flow from amalgamation, there is no theoretical presumption that economies of scale will result. Moreover, avail able international evidence is ambiguous on the question of economies of scale and may indicate smaller councils could be more efficient.
This suggests that public policy-makers should seek to provide the legislative framework to facilitate resource sharing or cooperative interaction between local government authorities. For example, if a constellation of neighbouring existing councils (who presumably possess the best knowledge of local circumstances) be lieves that some service can be provided more cheaply through joint provision, then State and federal governments should encourage cooperation. It is by no means obvious that resource-sharing along these lines in any way necessitates the political amalgamation of participating councils. Accordingly, existing local government de mocracy is thus not incompatible with die achievement of economies of scale.
The feasibility of resource-sharing arrangements in Australian local government does not have to be demonstrated: a long history of cooperative action already ex ists. Examples include regional libraries, regional waste operations, bulk purchasing agreements, and sharing specialist and technical staff amongst adjacent councils (NSW Department of Local Government, 1995; Grant & Payne, 1997) .
The views of the local government community itself are crucial in the formula tion of any rational policy prescriptions for the sector and at present it is difficult to ascertain fliese views. However, the Australian Institute of Urban Studies has commissioned the Centre for Local Government at the University of New England to investigate this question. Although it is too early to anticipate the findings of their research, policy-makers no doubt await their report with considerable interest.
